

ON THE EFFECT OF PROJECTION ON RANK ATTACKS IN MULTIVARIATE CRYPTOGRAPHY

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July 2021

Introduction

The *Big-Field Schemes* form a class of multivariate signature and encryption schemes. The most prominent example is the HFEv- signature scheme, which GeMSS is based on.

In late 2020, Tao, Petzoldt and Ding proposed a new rank attack, which breaks the current parameters of HFEv- (and GeMSS).

There are other combinations of central maps and modifiers among the Big-Field Schemes. How does this new attack affect them?

In particular, we will focus on pHFEv- and PFLASH.

Multivariate Signature Schemes

- **Public Key:** system of n quadratic polynomial equations in $\mathbb{F}_q[x_1, \dots, x_n]$.

- **Signing:** For a document (d_1, \dots, d_n) , solve the system

$$\begin{aligned} p_1(x_1, \dots, x_n) &= d_1 \\ \dots & \\ p_d(x_1, \dots, x_n) &= d_n \end{aligned}$$

to recover a valid signature (c_1, \dots, c_n) .

- **Verification:** evaluate the polynomials $p_1(x_1, \dots, x_n), \dots, p_n(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ on the signature (c_1, \dots, c_n) and verify that it equals (d_1, \dots, d_n) .

The HFE- Signature Scheme

Let $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times n}$ and $\mathbf{T} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times (n-a)}$ be secret matrices of maximal rank.
 $\phi : \mathbb{F}_q^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{q^n}$ an isomorphism.

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} & & \mathbb{F}_{q^n} & \xrightarrow{f(X)} & \mathbb{F}_{q^n} \\ & & \uparrow \phi & & \downarrow \phi^{-1} \\ \mathbb{F}_q^n & \xrightarrow{\mathbf{S}} & \mathbb{F}_q^n & & \mathbb{F}_q^n \xrightarrow{\mathbf{T}} \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-a)} \\ & \text{-----} & & \text{-----} & \\ & & p_1, \dots, p_{n-a} \in \overline{\mathbb{F}_q}[x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n] & & \end{array}$$

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 \end{array}$$

$$f(X) = f_{hfe}(X) = \sum_{\substack{i,j \in \mathbb{N} \\ q^i + q^j \leq D}} \alpha_{i,j} X^{q^i + q^j} + \sum_{\substack{i \in \mathbb{N} \\ q^i \leq D}} \beta_i X^{q^i} + \gamma,$$

where $\alpha_{i,j}, \beta_i, \gamma \in \mathbb{F}_{q^n}[X]$. D is (relatively) small for signing to be efficient.

The MinRank Problem

MinRank Problem

For a target rank r , and k matrices $M_i \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$, find a nontrivial set of constants $(u_0 \dots, u_{k-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$ such that

$$\text{Rank} \left(\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} k_i M_i \right) \leq r.$$

The problem is NP-complete in general, but can be solved in practice for small r .

Solving a certain instance of the MinRank problem is typically the hardest step in a rank attack.

Polynomials and Matrices

Any (homogeneous) quadratic polynomial can be written using a symmetric matrix.

If $\text{Char}(\mathbb{F}_q) > 2$, then this is the $(n \times n)$ matrix \mathbf{P}_i such that

$$p_i(x_1, \dots, x_n) = [x_1 \quad \dots \quad x_n] \mathbf{P}_i \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ \vdots \\ x_n \end{bmatrix}.$$

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Over the ring $\mathbb{F}_{q^n}[X]$, we use:

$$f^{q^i}(X) = [X \quad X^q \quad \dots \quad X^{q^{n-1}}] \mathbf{F}^{*i} \begin{bmatrix} X \\ \vdots \\ X^{q^{n-1}} \end{bmatrix}.$$

There is an invertible matrix $\mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^n}^{n \times n}$, such that the public key can be written as:

$$(\mathbf{P}_1 | \cdots | \mathbf{P}_{n-a}) = \left(\mathbf{SMF}^{*0}(\mathbf{SM})^\top | \cdots | \mathbf{SMF}^{*(n-1)}(\mathbf{SM})^\top \right) (\mathbf{M}^{-1}\mathbf{T} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n).$$

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Tao–Petzoldt–Ding suggest to solve a MinRank problem for the indeterminate vector $\mathbf{u} = (u_0, \dots, u_{n-1})$ in:

$$\mathbf{uP}^* := \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{uP}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{uP}_{n-a} \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^n}^{(n-a) \times n}$$

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
To see why this works, let $\mathbf{v} = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$, and inspect:

$$\mathbf{vF}^* := \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{vF}^{*0} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{vF}^{*n-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

Sketch of \mathbf{F}^{*0} ($d = \lceil \log_q D \rceil$)

$$\begin{pmatrix} \begin{array}{cc|cc|ccc} * & * & 0 & 0 & \dots & & \\ * & * & \vdots & \vdots & \dots & \dots & \end{array} \end{pmatrix}$$

Three Superimposed \mathbf{F}^{*i} Matrices



Attack Against HFE-

At most $d = \log_q D$ of the \mathbf{F}^{*i} matrices have a nonzero first row.

\Rightarrow There is a nonzero vector $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^n}^n$ such that

$$\mathbf{uP}^* := \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{uP}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{uP}_{n-a} \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^n}^{(n-a) \times n}$$

has rank at most d . \mathbf{u} can be found by solving a MinRank problem.

This observation relies on the input matrix, \mathbf{S} , being invertible. What happens if this is not the case?

pHFE- and PFLASH

Let $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-p) \times n}$ and $\mathbf{T} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times (n-a)}$ be secret matrices of maximal rank.
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PFLASH: $f(X) = f_{C^*}(X) = X^{q^\theta + 1}$

For signature schemes, projection typically adds a factor q^p to signing time.

Sketch: Bounding the Degree for pHFE-

Lemma

A linear map $S : \mathbb{F}_q^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^n$, where $|\text{Ker}(S)| = q^p$, can be written as

$$S = \phi^{-1} \circ \pi \circ \phi \circ S',$$

where S' is an invertible linear map, and $\pi \in \mathbb{F}_{q^n}[X]$ a q -linear polynomial of degree q^p .

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The public key can then be written as:

$$T \circ \phi^{-1} \circ f \circ \phi \circ S = T \circ \phi^{-1} \circ f \circ \pi \circ \phi \circ S'.$$

How does the “new” central map $f \circ \pi$ behave?

$p = 0$, $d \times d$ -Block. $p > 0$, $(d + p) \times (d + p)$ -Block



Sketch: Bounding the Degree for pHFE-

Proposition

Let $(\mathbf{P}_1, \dots, \mathbf{P}_{n-a})$ be the public key of an instance of pHFEv-. Then there is a nonzero tuple $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^n}^{n-p}$ such that $\mathbf{u}\mathbf{P}^*$ has rank at most $p + d$.


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We can use a similar line of argument for the C^* central map (PFLASH), but the resulting bound will not be tight.

$$\begin{pmatrix} & 1 & \\ 1 & & \end{pmatrix}$$



Sketch for $p = 1$

Consider a vector of weight 2: $\mathbf{v} = (1, 0, \dots, 0, 1, 0, \dots, 0)$, and multiply it with the matrices:

$$\left(\begin{array}{cccc} & & & \text{grey} \\ & & & \text{green} \\ & & & \text{blue} \\ \text{grey} & & & \\ & \text{green} & & \\ & & \text{blue} & \end{array} \right)$$

The resulting matrix $\mathbf{v}\mathbf{F}_{C^*}^*$ will have weight 4.

Small Example: $n = 7$, $\theta = 2$, $p = 1$

We choose the vector $\mathbf{v} = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)$. The first matrix of the central map is:

$$\mathbf{F}_{C^*}^{*0} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

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The matrix constructed from the various vector–matrix products will be

$$\mathbf{vF}_{C^*}^* = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

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Step I: Construct vectors of weight $1 + p$ that minimizes the rank (depends on θ).

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Step II: Show that this vector lies in the image of \mathbf{SM} .

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Proposition

Let $(\mathbf{P}_1, \dots, \mathbf{P}_{n-a})$ be the public key of an instance of PFLASH. Then there is a nonzero tuple $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^n}^{n-p}$ such that $\mathbf{u}\mathbf{P}^*$ has rank at most $2 + p$.

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We also discuss the number solutions \mathbf{u} for the MinRank problem, and identify weak choices of θ . See the paper for more details.

Experiments: pHFE- (Top) and PFLASH (Bottom)

q	n	a	p	D	Upper Bound	Rank of uP*
2	13	0	1	5	4	3, 4
2	13	0	2	5	5	4, 5
2	13	0	3	5	6	5
2	15	0	4	5	7	6
2	13	0	0	9	4	3, 4
2	13	4	1	9	5	4, 5
2	13	4	2	9	6	5, 6
2	17	6	1	9	5	4, 5
2	13	4	0	17	5	4, 5
2	13	4	1	17	6	5, 6
2	13	0	2	17	7	6

q	n	a	p	θ	Upper Bound	Rank of uP*
2	21	0	1	13	3	2, 3
2	21	0	2	13	4	3, 4
4	31	0	1	7	3	2
4	13	0	3	5	5	4, 5
4	25	8	0	11	2	1, 2
4	25	8	1	11	3	2, 3
4	17	5	3	7	5	4, 5
2	15	1	4	7	6	5, 6
2	15	0	5	7	7	6
4	14	4	4	5	6	5

Effects on variants of HFE

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In terms of signing time, projection is more efficient. Over \mathbb{F}_2 , it is faster by a factor

$$\frac{(p + \log_2 D)^2 \log_2(p + \log_2 D)}{\log_2(D)^2 \log_2 \log_2 D}$$

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Scheme	p_1^a	p_2^b
GeMSS128	2	0
RedGeMSS128	6	4
GeMSS256	14	10
RedGeMSS256	18	14

^aUsing $\omega = 2.37$

^bUsing $\omega = 2.81$

Effects on variants of C^* (PFLASH)

The suggested projection used in PFLASH ($p = 1$) is not sufficient to achieve security.

More work needed to find good parameters for PFLASH.

Conclusions

- The new rank attack by Tao, Petzoldt and Ding can also be used against PFLASH.
- Adding (or increasing the size of the) projection can be used to counter this attack.
- Projection increases the signing time for signature schemes (often cheap for encryption schemes).